Divorce Tax Law after \u2784 Reform More Predictable but Still Complex by Gerzog, Wendy G. & Lynch, John A., Jr.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 16
Number 2 Winter, 1986 Article 2
1986
Divorce Tax Law after '84 Reform More Predictable
but Still Complex
Wendy G. Gerzog
University of Baltimore School of Law, wgerzog@ubalt.edu
John A. Lynch Jr.
University of Baltimore School of Law, jlynch@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gerzog, Wendy G. and Lynch, John A. Jr. (1986) "Divorce Tax Law after '84 Reform More Predictable but Still Complex," University of
Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 16: No. 2, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol16/iss2/2
Divorce Tax Law after '84 Reform 
More Predictable but Still Complex 
F or many years, the tax law related to divorce has been plagued by complexity and uncertainty. Much 
of the confusion has been caused by at-
tempts of the courts to respect the eco-
nomic circumstances of the parties and dif-
ferences in state law in characterizing 
divorce-related payments as alimony vel 
non for federal income tax purposes. Ex-
perience with former I.R.C. § 71 (which 
required a recipient to include alimony-
like payments in income) and comple-
mentary § 215 (which allowed a paying 
spouse to deduct such payments) has dem-
onstrated that tax law provisions related to 
divorce are singularly inappropriate places 
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for complexity. The Tax Reform Act of 
19841 has now made the characterization 
of divorce related payments a much more 
mechanical process. The Act has also made 
several other changes that affect payments 
and property transfers among the parties 
to a divorce. This article will discuss those 
changes. 
A New Def"mition of Alimony 
Prior law provided generally that pay-
ments pursuant to a divorce or separation 
agreement, decree or instrument which 
represented an obligation of support for a 
spouse (rather than a child) were deduct-
ible from the gross income of the paying 
spouse and includable for the recipient if 
they were periodic. 2 The periodic require-
ment provided as a general rule that the 
payments had to be for an indefinite dura-
tion rather than installments of a fixed 
amount. 3 If the divorce decree or agree-
ment fixed a definite total of payments and 
such a sum was payable over a period of 
longer than ten years, the payments, though 
not indefinite, were deemed to be periodic. 
If such payments could be terminated or 
modified within a fixed period ofless than 
ten years by the happening of contingen-
cies, such as the death or change in eco-
nomic circumstances of the parties, the 
payments could also be regarded as peri-
odic.4 Although the statute did not ex-
plicitly so provide, payments which repre-
sented a property settlement, of whatever 
form or duration, were not deductible by 
the payor or income to the recipient. 5 U n-
der the old law, many courts looked behind 
labels in divorce agreements in character-
izing payments for tax purposes.6 They 
looked to factors such as the net worth of 
the parties, the need of the recipient for 
support and the negotiations of the parties. 
This approach was the greatest cause of 
unpredictability under prior law. The 
prior law applies to payments under di-
vorce or separation instruments executed 
before January 1, 1985 and instruments 
after that date which adopt pre-1985 in-
struments without change. If pre-1985 
instruments are subsequently modified 
with respect to the amount or time period 
of payments of alimony or to provide that 
the new provisions are to be applied, new 
section 71 applies. 7 
Section 71, as amended, not only pro-
vides for inclusion of alimony or sep-
arate maintenance payments but it also 
provides, for the first time, a definition of 
alimony for federal income tax purposes. 
While there is an attempt to define alimony 
in a fashion which includes the essentials 
of what is commonly understood as repre-
sentative of a support obligation, it is a 
definition which can be applied with more 
mechanical precision than the support ob-
ligation and periodic payment require-
ments of prior law. First, to be deductible 
such payments must be in cash, must be to 
a spouse or a third party on behalf of a 
spouse and must be made pursuant to a di-
vorce or separation instrument. 8 Second, 
such payments must not be designated un-
der the instrument as not includable in 
gross income under § 71 and deductible 
under §215.9 Third, in the case ofindivid-
uals who are legally separated under a de-
cree of divorce or separate maintenance, 
the payee and payor must not be members 
of the same household. lo Finally, there 
must be no liability to make such payments 
after the death of the payee spouse or lia-
bility to make any substitute payments after 
the payee spouse's death. Furthermore, the 
divorce instrument must state that there is 
no such liability.ll Divorce or separation 
instrument is defined much as it was under 
prior law: a decree of divorce or separation 
or a written instrument incident to such 
decree, a written instrument or a decree 
requiring a spouse to make payments for 
the support and maintenance of the other 
spouse, such as a decree pendente lite. 12 
If the above mentioned requirements are 
satisfied, the payments are alimony for 
federal income tax purposes regardless of 
the circumstances of the parties or their 
rights under state law. Conversely, if the 
parties designate the payments as not in-
cludable in the recipient's income under 
§ 71 or deductible by the payor under 
§ 215, they are so treated for tax purposes 
even when the circumstances of the parties 
indicate that the payments could not rep-
resent a property settlement. The require-
ment that there be no payment after death 
of the payee and the restrictions on excess 
front-loading (discussed below) tend to re-
quire that a recipient include only pay-
ments which represent a support obliga-
tion. 
There is some explanation of these re-
quirements in the House Ways and Means 
Committee report. 13 In addition, last 
August, the IRS issued temporary regula-
tions which also provide some assistance 
in construing the statute. Concerning the 
requirement that the payments be in cash 
to or on behalf of a payee spouse, the House 
report states that a cash payment may be 
made to a third party for benefit of the 
payee. 14 The temporary regulations pro-
vide that alimony treatment may be ex-
tended to payments of rent, mortgage 
indebtedness or tuition on behalf of a 
spouse. IS As under prior law, a paying 
spouse may not deduct mortgage payments 
on property which he or she owns and may 
deduct payment of life insurance premi-
ums only to the extent the other spouse 
owns the policy. 16 
An interesting question is whether a pay-
ment by one spouse to the other spouse's 
attorney for legal fees in connection with 
the divorce would be treated as alimony 
under the new law. It would clearly be for 
the benefit of the spouse whose attorney is 
paid. On the other hand, such a payment 
would still represent an outlay for legal 
fees in a personal context, nondeductible 
under United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 
39 (1963). 
As to the requirement that to be alimony 
such payments must not be designated as 
not includable under § 71 or deductible 
under § 215, the House report provides 
that the parties may avoid application of 
these sections by a clearly designated writ-
ten agreement.J7 The language of the 
statute, however, does not appear to pre-
vent a judge in a divorce suit from order-
ing in a decree that payments not be in-
cludable by the recipient or deductible by 
the payor. 
Regarding the requirement that the 
spouses not be members of the same house-
hold, the House report provides that the 
parties to a divorce are not to be treated as 
members of the same household where the 
taxpayer is preparing to depart shortly 
from the household of the other spouse. IS 
The temporary regulations provide that the 
departure of one of the spouses from the 
household must be within one month after 
the date the payment is made. 19 Moreover, 
the regulations provide that a dwelling 
unit formerly used by the spouses may not 
be regarded as two separate households 
even if they physically separate them-
selves. 20 
With respect to the requirement that 
payments must not continue after the 
payee's death and that no substitute may 
be provided, the House report provides 
that while an additional amount of child 
support after a payee's death would be a 
proscribed substitute payment, amounts 
payable under a life insurance contract on 
the payee's life would not be. 21 The tem-
porary regulations provide that the divorce 
instrument must state that there is no lia-
bility to make payments after the death of 
the payee spouse. It is not sufficient that 
local law would so provide. 22 It is not nec-
essary, according to the regulations, that 
the instrument provide that there is no lia-
bility to make a substitute payment. 23 The 
regulations provide an example of how this 
requirement would work. If under a di-
vorce instrument one spouse is required to 
pay $30,000 per year to the other during 
her life and then $10,000 per year in the 
event of the payee's death to a trust for the 
support of their children, $20,000 per year 
during the payee's life would be regarded 
as alimony.24 
Limitations on "Front-Loading" 
Revised § 71 strives to deter character-
ization of property transfers as alimony 
and distortion of income through its excess 
front-loading provisions. There are two 
such provisions: a minimum term provi-
sion and a recapture provision. These two 
provisions probably bring the greatest de-
gree of complexity to the new law. 
Under the minimum term provisions, a 
paying spouse may treat payments as ali-
mony to the extent they exceed $10,000 
only if alimony payments under the di-
vorce instrument are to be made in each of 
the six post separation years. 25 The six 
post separation years are the first calendar 
year in which an alimony payment (other 
than payments under a temporary support 
order) is made and the five following cal-
endar years. 26 If payments are not to be 
made in each of the six post separation 
years, they are treated as alimony only up 
to $10,000 in anyone year. However, this 
rule does not apply if the payments are ter-
minated in the post separation years upon 
the death of either spouse or upon remar-
riage of the payeeY 
Under the recapture rule, if payments in 
any of the last five post separation years are 
exceeded by the alimony payments of any 
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previous post separation year by more than 
$10,000, such excess over $10,000 must 
be taken into income by the paying spouse 
and may be deducted by the recipient. 28 
Again, this rule does not apply with respect 
to payments under a temporary support 
order according to temporary regulations. 29 
The rule is not applicable if the variation 
in the payments is caused by termination 
of the payments at the death of either 
spouse, the remarriage of the payee, or if 
the amount of the payments is a fIxed per-
centage of the income of a business or 
property or of the income from employ-
ment or self-employment of the payor. 30 
The operation of the recapture rule may 
be illustrated as follows: Assume that A is 
required to make payments of$50,000 per 
year to B, A's former spouse, in each of the 
six years after divorce. In year 1, A pays B 
$50,000 but in years 2 and 3 A pays only 
$30,000 and $10,000 respectively. In year 
2, A must recapture, or include as income, 
$10,000, the amount by which the excess 
paid in year 1 over year 2 exceeds $10,000. 
After recapture, the amount paid in year 1 
is deemed to be $40,000. In year 3, A must 
look at both years 1 and 2. Payments in 
year 1, now deemed to be $40,000, exceed 
those in year 3 by $30,000, or $20,000 in 
excess of$lO,OOO. Thus $20,000 is recap-
tured as to year 1. Payments in year 2, 
$30,000, exceed those in year 3 by $20,000; 
thus, $10,000 is recaptured as to year 2. 
Complicated as these rules may ap-
pear at fIrst, their practical signifIcance is 
clear. From the point of view of the pay-
ing spouse, widespread variations in the 
amounts paid or payable under a divorce 
instrument are not a good idea. It is quite 
possible that harsh application of the re-
capture rules will serve as a stronger in-
ducement to make the payments provided 
for in divorce instruments than the often 
ineffectual contempt power of domestic 
relations courts. 
Alimony Trusts 
Section 71, as revised, no longer pro-
vides for inclusion of the income of an ali-
mony trust to the recipient of such income. 
Revised § 682 now does so, however. Un-
der § 682, such trust income is not includ-
able in the other spouse's income. Under 
§ 215, the "payor" does not receive a de-
duction for payments from an alimony 
trust which are includable in the recipient's 
income. 
Transfer of Property 
Under prior law, when a spouse trans-
ferred appreciated property to his or her 
"ex" as part of a property settlement, the 
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transferor had to recognize a gain. 31 For 
example, if a husband transferred a house 
which he had purchased for $50,000, if that 
house had increased in value to $75,000 at 
the time of the transfer, he would have to 
report a $25,000 gain as income (although 
the gain, if long term capital gain, would 
only be included as income at 40% of the 
gain-here $10,000). The transferee's basis 
in the property was $75,000 so that when 
the property was later sold at $80,000, the 
transferee had only a $5,000 gain. If, how-
ever, the parties lived in community prop-
erty law jurisdictions, or the property was 
jointly owned, the transferor was viewed 
as merely distributing property already 
half-owned by one of the spouses and the 
above rule did not apply.32 
.. . harsh application 
of the recapture rules 
will serve as a 
stronger inducement 
to make the 
payments . . . than 
the often ineffectual 
contempt power of 
domestic relations 
courts. 
Because gifts between spouses since 
1981 are not subject to gift taxes, 33 because 
of the disparate treatment given such trans-
fers in community and common law states, 
and because it was often the IRS who lost 
revenue when the transferor failed to re-
port any gain at the time of the transfer, 
Congress changed the law regarding trans-
fers of property between spouses incident 
to a divorce effective for transfers after 
July 18, 1984.34 
The new law provides for a carry-over 
basis on transfers incident to a divorce and 
that no gain is recognized until the trans-
feree disposes of the property.35 Accord-
ing to the temporary regulations, even if 
the transfer is a bona fide sale, there is still 
a carry-over basis. 36 Under the 1984 Act, 
applying the facts in the above example, 
the transferor reports no gain on the trans-
fer of the house; however, the transferee's 
basis in the property is $50,000 so that if 
he/she then sells the property for $80,000, 
he/she will have to recognize a $30,000 
gain instead of merely the $5,000 gain un-
der prior law. A transfer occurring within 
one year after a marriage ends, or if the 
transfer is related to the end of a marriage, 
will be treated as being incident to a di-
vorce; therefore, even property acquired 
after a divorce could be governed by these 
new rules. The new law also applies to 
transfers made after 1983 but on or before 
July 18, 1984, where both parties so electY 
However, the law does not apply where 
the transferee spouse is a nonresident 
alien. 38 
Although the transferee spouse will gen-
erally be in a lower tax bracket so that the 
aggregate tax on the gain will be less than it 
would have been under prior law, it is the 
transferee spouse who will be liable for the 
entire amount of gain. Since the transferee 
spouse is encumbered with paying the tax 
on appreciation occurring both before and 
after the divorce, he or she should make 
certain that these future tax consequences 
are taken into account when determining 
which property he or she will receive. 
Moreover, since some of that gain may be 
recaptured as ordinary income instead of 
being taxed at the more favorable capital 
gains rates,39 this effect too must now be 
considered during divorce negotiations. 
Finally, under the new law, it is irrele-
vant that the basis at the time of the trans-
fer is greater than the property's fair mar-
ket value. Unlike other "gifts" which, in 
order to determine loss, apply the fair mar-
ket value at the time of the gift, transfers 
between spouses or ex-spouses retain the 
transferor's basis for purposes of determin-
ing loss as well as gain when the property 
is later sold by the transferee. 40 
Child Support 
Under prior law, the Supreme Court, in 
Commissioner v. Lester,41 strictly inter-
preted the rule that payments not specifI-
cally "fIxed" as child support by a decree, 
instrument, or agreement were treated as 
alimony. In Lester, the agreement provided 
that if any of the taxpayer's three children 
married, became emancipated or died, the 
payments would be reduced by one-sixth 
of the payments which would otherwise 
have been due. While the Court could 
have inferred that one-half of the taxpayer's 
payments constituted child support and 
the other half alimony, it narrowly read 
the statute regarding child support to re-
quire that the agreement explicitly state a 
specifIc amount or percentage of the pay-
ments as child support in order to be char-
acterized as child support. SignifIcantly, 
child support, unlike alimony, is not in-
come to the recipient nor deductible by the 
payor spouse. 42 
Under the new legislation, where an 
amount stated by the instrument is to be 
reduced when a contingency occurs in re-
lation to a child (e.g., reaching a specific 
age, marrying, dying, leaving school), or at 
a time clearly associated with a contingency 
occurring to the payor's child, the reduc-
tion will be deemed to be an amount "fixed" 
as child support. 43 Thus, in a Lester situa-
tion, under current law, the amounts would 
be characterized as child support. The 
temporary regulations44 specify two situa-
tions in which payments otherwise consid-
ered to be alimony will be presumed to be 
reduced at a time clearly associated with a 
contingency occurring to the payor's child: 
(1) where payments are to be reduced no 
more than six months pre-or-post the child's 
attaining the age of majority and (2) where 
payments are reduced on two or three oc-
casions occurring not more than one year 
before or after a different child of the payor 
spouse attains a certain age between the 
ages of eighteen to twenty-four. The sec-
ond situation may be demonstrated as fol-
lows. Assume that payee receives $2,000 
per month which is to be reduced to $1,500 
on January 1, 1991 when one child reaches 
20 years, 5 months, 17 days old and to 
$1,000 on January 1,1995, when his sibling 
who is approximately two years younger 
reaches 22 years, 3 months and 9 days. 
Since each reduction occurs not more than 
one year before or after different children 
attain age 21 years, 4 months, the pre-
sumption will apply. However, ifit can be 
shown that the reductions were timed to 
occur when they did for independent rea-
sons, the payments could still constitute 
alimony. 
Dependency Exemptions 
Under prior law, in the case of divorced 
or separated parents, the custodial parent 
(the one with custody for more than one-
half of the year) was entitled to claim an ex-
emption for each dependent child unless 
either (1) the noncustodial parent paid at 
least $600 for each child's support and the 
parents had a decree or written agreement 
providing that the noncustodial parent was 
entitled to claim the dependency exemp-
tion; or (2) the noncustodial parent pro-
vided at least $1,200 for each child's sup-
port and the custodial parent did not clearly 
establish he provided more support during 
the year than the noncustodial parent. 45 
Again, because of the great number of 
controversies arising particularly under 
the second exception, the 1984 Act changes 
provide for greater simplicity and certainty. 
Essentially, effective for years beginning 
in 1985, the custodial parent is entitled to 
claim the exemption46 for each dependent 
child unless the custodial parent signs a 
written waiver stating that he/she will not 
claim the child as a dependent; the non-
custodial parent must attach the declara-
tion to his/her tax return each year. 47 The 
new law provides that the custodial parent 
may make an annual or a permanent decla-
ration of a waiver. He/she may also specify 
that the declaration relate to several tax 
years.48 In order to provide an incentive 
for the noncustodial parent to continue 
making support payments, however, the 
custodial parent may prefer to make this 
waiver on an annual basis. Where the 
waiver is a permanent one, the noncus-
todial parent must still attach a copy of the 
waiver to each subsequent year's return.49 
The new law also provides that any sup-
port furnished by the spouse of a remarried 
parent will be deemed to be a contribution 
by that parent. 50 
The new provisions extend their appli-
cation not only to parents who are divorced 
or separated under a written agreement 
but also to parents who are living apart for 
the last six months of the year. 51 With re-
spect to any decree or written agreement 
executed before 1985 which stated that the 
noncustodial parent was entitled to the de-
pendency exemption(s), however, prior 
law will continue to apply unless the parties 
modify their agreement expressly stating 
that the new law will control. 52 Also, un-
der both prior and current law, these pro-
visions do not apply to multiple support 
agreements. 53 
Although a parent may be unable to 
claim his/her child as a dependent under 
the new rules, he/she may still be entitled 
to claim a medical expense deduction54 or 
an income exclusion for medical expenses 
paid by an employer55 and/or a child care 
credit for expenses actually paid by him/ 
her. 56 Similarly, that parent may be able to 
claim an earned income credit 57 and/or file 
as head of household 58 even though he/she 
has filed a waiver or cannot claim the child 
as a dependent under a pre-1985 divorce 
or settlement agreement. It must be noted, 
however, that a child may not be classified 
as a dependent under either prior or cur-
rent law if he/she has gross income above 
$1,000 unless he/she is under 19 years old 
or a student. 59 
Conclusion 
Most tax legislation is described by Con-
gress with euphemistic terms such as "re-
form," "simplification" or "equity." In the 
field of domestic relations taxation, the Tax 
Reform Act may not have made the law 
any simpler. Nevertheless, it is quite likely 
that domestic relations counsel will be able 
to predict the tax consequences of divorce 
agreements and decrees with more confi-
dence. That must undeniably be regarded 
as reform. 
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an athlete at the Baltimore County Spring Games at 
Catonsville Community College on May 10. 1986. 
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